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Constitutional Law-HATCH ACT-TIME FOR RE-EVALUATION?-
United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter
Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973).
The initial attempt at restricting the political activities of federal em-
ployees appears to have been the establishment of the U. S. Civil Service
Commission.' When the Commission failed as a strong enough deterrent
to political activity, an amendment of § 1 of Civil Service Rule I was
approved 2 to tighten the reigns on members of the competitive classified
service. Finally, in the wake of the political campaigns of 1936 and 1938,
the Hatch Political Activity Act was introduced3 as a prohibition against
participation by federal government employees in political management or
campaigning.
In the recent case of United States Civil Service Commission v. National
Association of Letter Carriers4 the United States Supreme Court re-
examined the constitutionality of the Hatch Act, in a challenge by the
National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, and six federal employ-
ees. These plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the Act's ban
against federal employees taking an active part in political management
or campaigns 5 was unconstitutional on its face. At the district level a
1. The Commission was established by the Civil Service Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22
Stat. 403.
2. In 1907 President Theodore Roosevelt issued Executive Order 642 which authorized the
amending of § 1 of Civil Service Rule I so that it would read:
No person in the Executive civil service shall use his official authority or influence for
the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the results thereof. Persons who,
by the provisions of these rules are in the competitive classified service, while retaining
the right to vote as they please and to express privately their opinions on all political
subjects, shall take no active part in political management or in political campaigns.
TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 104 (1908).
3. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147. The Act was originally enacted to extend
Civil Service Rule I's prohibitions (see note 2 supra) to the entire federal service. It was
amended in 1940 to extend the prohibitions to state and local agencies financed by the U.S.
government. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767.
Although the Hatch Act was basically the product of the two aforementioned enactments,
the idea behind the introduction of this Act was expressed more than a century earlier when
Thomas Jefferson spoke out against the far reaching effects political activities of government
employees had on elections and jobs. THE COMMlSSION ON POLIcAL Acrivry OF GOVERNMENT
PERSONNEL, A CoMmissmN REPORT 7 (1968).
For purposes of this case the pertinent sections of the Hatch Act can be found in 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1501-1508, 7323-7327 (1970) (Although it is codified in scattered sections of Titles 5, 18).
4. 93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1970) provides:
(a) An employee in an Executive agency or an individual employed by the govern-
ment of the District of Columbia may not-
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divided three judge court found the section to be vague and overly broad,
declaring it unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement. The Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of district court, relying on a prior decision 7
upholding the constitutional validity of the Hatch Act.
The majority in Letter Carriers dealt with the entire development of the
law concerning political activities of government employees. Justice White
announced in reaffirming the Court's holding in United Public Workers v.
Mitchell' that the decision in Letter Carriers merely confirms a judgment
of history, that federal employees political activities should be carefully
limited? Rejecting the claim that the Act is unconstitutionally vague and
overly broad, the Court relied in part on the volumes of interpretations of
Civil Service Rule I" made available by the Civil Service Commission."
The Court's reasoning here is based on the belief that its duty was to
construe the Act to agree with constitutional limitations, while recognizing
the intention of Congress that the body of law developed by the Commis-
sion be looked on as controlling questions concerning prohibited political
activities of government employees.1 2 Specifically, the Court in Letter
Carriers stated that it felt the list of prohibited activities' 3 drawn up by
the Civil Service Commission was laid out in terms the average person
could understand and comply with, without harming the public interest,
and therefore the Act was not impermissibly vague." This line of reasoning
(2) take an active part in political management or in political campaigns.
The phrase "an active part in political management or political campaigns" means those acts
of political management or political campaigning which were prohibited on the part of em-
ployees in the competitive service before July 19, 1940, by determinations of the Civil Service
Commission under the rules prescribed by the President.
6. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346 F. Supp.
578 (D.D.C. 1972).
7. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880,
2886 (1973); see United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (4-3 decision) (Rutledge,
Douglas & Black, J.J., dissenting) (Murphy & Jackson J.J., not participating). The Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Act's ban on federal employee political activity; a lowly
roller for the United States Mint was dismissed for acting as a party ward chairman.
8. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
9. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880,
2886 (1973).
10. Id. at 2892.
11. Under 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) the prior determinations of the Civil Service Commission
concerning Civil Service Rule I are to be used in deciding what the phrase "taking an active
part in political management or campaigns" means.
12. 93 S. Ct. at 2893-95.
13. Id. at 2897-98; see 5 C.F.R. § 733.122 (1973). This section specifies in separate para-
graphs the numerous activities termed prohibited by § 7324(a)(2) of the United States Code
under title 5 (Hatch Act).
14. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880,
2896-97 (1973).
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appears to be based on the Court's feeling that Congress enacted the Act
relying on the "teaching of experience,"' 5 and still deems it appropriate
today.'" Therefore, any modification of this law will be for the legislature
to propose.
Furthermore, the Court noted that only partisan political activity is
forbidden by the Hatch Act, so public expressions could in fact be made
on matters of public interest, provided these activities were not directed
toward party success.'7 The Court's point is that contrary to the appellees'
claim, the political freedoms a public employee enjoys are indeed quite
broad. Dealing with the recent Civil Service Regulations"5 the Court found
little difficulty in reconciling two seemingly contradictory sections,19 ulti-
mately reasoning that with the questionable sections clarified, the statute
could withstand any attack of overbreadth. 5 Finally, the Court stated that
if the provisions forbidding partisan campaign endorsements and speech-
making were found to be unconstitutionally overbroad in some respects,
they would not invalidate the entire statute.' The Court's reasoning here
is that the Civil Service Regulations are merely regulatory guidelines for
interpreting part of the Hatch Act and therefore can be found unconstitu-
tional without affecting the constitutionality of the Act itself.
The right of a federal employee to engage in political activity is unmis-
takably guaranteed by the freedom of expression clause of the first amend-
ment and is a right reserved to the people by the ninth and tenth amend-
15. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880,
2886 (1973) quoting United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947).
16. Although many bills have been introduced to liberalize the restrictions of the Hatch
Act, no new legislation has developed. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n
of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880, 2889 (1973).
17. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880,
2886 (1973) quoting United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
18. 5 C.F.R. §§ 733.111, 733.122 (1973).
19. Under 5 C.F.R. § 733.111(a)(2) the employee is privileged to "[e]xpress his opinion
as an individual privately and publicly on political subjects and candidates." But
§ 733.122(a)(10) prohibits the endorsement of "a partisan candidate for public office or
political party office in a political advertisement, a broadcast, campaign literature or similar
material," and subparagraph (a)(12) prohibits "addressing a convention, caucus, rally or
similar gathering of a political party in support of or in opposition to a partisan candidate
for public office or political party office."
The Court reasoned that the prohibited conduct stated above was ordinarily performed by
one taking an active role in partisan campaigns and as such could be sustained on the same
basis that the other acts of political campaigning are proscribable. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880, 2896-98 (1973).
20. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880,
2898 (1973).
21. Id.
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ments.12 However, as Justice White pointed out in delivering the opinion
of the Court in Letter Carriers, neither the right to associate nor the right
to engage in political activities is absolute in any event.23 The question to
be determined here is whether the supposed evil of political partisanship
is a compelling enough reason for permitting these constitutional rights to
be abridged.? Recognizing the fact that the object of the Hatch Act is
commendable indeed, the question arises as to whether the Congress ac-
tually considered the far reaching effect this legislation would have on
individual freedom.n Although the majority in Letter Carriers stated the
political freedoms a public employee enjoys under the Act are sufficiently
broad,2 6 it has been argued they are, in fact, rather limited.2 7 The Court
22. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-96 (1947).
23. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880,
2891 (1973). See, e.g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 93 S. Ct. 1245 (1973); Jenness v. Fortson, 403
U.S. 431 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968).
24. The problem with upholding the validity of legislation such as the Hatch Act is that:
It is one thing to attack the evils of improper political activity by appropriate discipline
and punishment; but it is quite another thing to suppress or curtail the exercise of
political rights because they might be abused. Mosher, Government Employees Under
the Hatch Act, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 233, 234 (1947) (emphasis added).
There are two possible tests which are applied in determining the constitutional standing
of a statute. Ordinarily a statute being attacked is presumed constitutional and will be upheld
as long as the Court can show a "reasonable justification for the legislative action." This is
known as the rationale basis test. Heady, The Hatch Act Decisions, 41 AM. POL. ScL REv.
687, 690 (1947). But when the legislation on its face restricts rights guaranteed by the first
amendment, no presumption of constitutionality arises, because these rights "are held to
occupy a preferred place in our scheme of constitutional values." Id. And so any limitations
on these rights must be grounded on a clear and present danger. See Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
25. In reading the Senate debates concerning the incorporation by reference of the numer-
ous Civil Service Commission rulings as the regulatory guidelines for the Hatch Act it would
appear from the record that the rulings were incorporated without ever being seen. For
example, Senator Minton stated that, "[n]o one on the floor of the Senate, not even the
Senator from New Mexico [Senator Hatch], now knows what these rules and regulations
are." 86 CONG. Rsc. 2940 (1940). Furthermore, Senator Brown said, "I say it is very careless
legislation in effect to write into statute law 62 pages of civil service rules and interpretations
by the Civil Service Commission, without knowing what we are doing." Id. at 2947.
26. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880,
2886 (1973).
27. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The sad
situation the Hatch Act leaves the employee and his family in was succinctly stated by
Justice Black:
[T]he sum of political privilege left to government and state employees, and their
families, to take part in political campaigns seems to be this: They may vote in silence;
they may carefully and quietly express a political view at their peril; and they may
become "spectators" (this is the Commission's word) at campaign gatherings, though
it may be highly dangerous for them to "second a motion" or let it be known that they
agree or disagree with a speaker. Id. at 108-09. (emphasis added).
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took a firm stand in deciding that the Civil Service provisions forbidding
partisan campaign endorsements and speech making were constitutionally
proscribable the same as other acts of political campaigning. 28 The effect
of the Act's vague prohibition against taking an active part in political
activity is that popular government is made the loser, because not only are
individual employees harmed, the nation as a whole is deprived of the
political voice of a large segment of society. 2 Justice Douglas dealt directly
with this issue in his dissent,"0 further stating that if government employ-
ment were merely a privilege3' enforcement of various conditions as pre-
The government employee must always be checking to determine whether "an organization
in which he holds office or an issue on which he expresses himself publicly has not shifted
from the nonpolitical to the partisan political sphere." Esman, The Hatch Act-A Reap-
praisal, 60 YALE L.J. 986, 998 (1951). See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). The result
of one constantly having to assess his position in connection with political issues is that he
will from the outset "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." Id. at 526.
An interesting statement was made recently by John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, United
States Civil Service Commission concerning the unclear nature of the Hatch Act:
In light of the present qualifying provision [statutory guarantee of right to vote and
express political opinions], the present language of the Act is broad and somewhat
unclear. It is broad in the sense that it could be construed to prohibit certain activities
that may not be sufficiently detrimental to the civil service as to justify the infringe-
ment of individual political rights. It is uncertain in that it fails to define with clarity
and precision the types of activities which are prohibited. CoMbussIoN ON PoLrricAL
AcrVTY OF GovENztNt.r PERSONNEL, REPORT, 15 (1968).
This statement tends to discredit the idea that the Act is laid out in clear and concise
language as the majority in Letter Carriers decided. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880, 2892 (1973). Yet even assuming this state-
ment to be premature in light of the recent Civil Service Regulations (see note 18 supra), a
prefatory paragraph was included in the regulations which in effect, made the list of prohib-
ited activities potentially limitless. "Activities prohibited by paragraph (a) of this section
include but are not limited to-." 5 C.F.R. § 733.122(b) (1973) (emphasis added).
28. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880,
2898 (1973). The problem with this idea is that, with the number of civil servants increasing
constantly, the government is gaining a disproportionate amount of power to regulate the
political conduct of its citizens.
29. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 111 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The
nation suffers not only because many government employees shun all political activities, but
also because many promising prospective employees avoid civil service altogether because of
the political restrictions imposed. Generally it appears that the average civil servant falls into
the category of "those who believe the written law means what it says," and so when they
cannot fully decipher what it says they will certainly strive to avoid all contact with it.
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 374 (1964).
30. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880,
2906 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Brennan & Marshall J.J., concurring). "Overbreadth
in the area of the First Amendment has a peculiar evil, the evil of creating chilling effects
which deter the exercise of those freedoms." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
31. The doctrine of "privilege" simply means that assuming the government may withhold
totally the privilege of public employment without an explanation, then it should be able to
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requisites to employment would be permissible. 2
In reading the opinion of the majority in the principal case, it is apparent
that the Court relied considerably on the decision it rendered in Mitchell,33
the reasoning and actual import of that case being rather questionable.34
One of the difficulties with relying on this case as precedent centers around
the question as to whether, in light of the changes in size and complexity
of public service, and subsequent decisions delineating first amendment
protections, it is still valid law. Another problem with relying on this
offer a form of conditional employment requiring the employee to surrender constitutionally
guaranteed rights. However, as Justice Douglas inferred in his dissent, this doctrine was
completely discredited when the Court said, "[the theory that public employment which
may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable,
has been uniformly rejected." Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
Keyishian covered academic employment, but recent federal court decisions have consis-
tently thwarted attempts by the government to place special limitations on the first amend-
ment freedoms of public employees. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (freedom
of religion); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (freedom of association of teachers);
McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968) (right to join unions in the absence of
legislation to the contrary); Steck v. Connally, 199 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1961) (civil servants
right to petition the government for redress of grievances). But despite the encouraging obiter
dictum in Torcaso typifying modern Supreme Court attitudes towards strict protection
against denial of individual rights as aptly stated in Justice Black's opinion, ". . . The fact,
however, that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot possibly be an excuse
for barring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitution"; Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961), the right of public employees to participate freely in
politics remains to be acknowledged. Shartsis, The Federal Hatch Act and Related State
Court Trends-A Time for Change? 25 Bus. LAWYER 1381, 1385 (1970).
32. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S.Ct. 2880,
2906 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Brennan & Marshall J.J., concurring).
33. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
34. In arriving at its decision in United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) the
Court relied on an earlier Supreme Court case believing the statute in that case to be similar
to the Hatch Act. Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882). However, there is a significant
difference in scope of limitations between prohibiting monetary political contributions from
one federal employee to another, as the statute relied on in Curtis did, and prohibiting
"political contributions of energy" as Justice Reed in Mitchell felt the Hatch Act did. Nelson,
Public Employees and the Right to Engage in Political Activity, 9 VAND. L. REv. 27, 38 (1955).
In the former every other avenue of political contributions of money was left open, which
saved the statute from being declared unconstitutional, see Ex Parte Curtis supra at 373-74,
while the latter closes every avenue of political action. So actually instead of being valid
precedent for the Mitchell decision, Curtis really represents "authority against the Hatch
Acts." Nelson, supra at 38; Wormuth, The Hatch Act Cases, 1 WESTERN POL. Q. 165, 172
(1948).
35. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346 F. Supp.
578, 585 (D.D.C. 1972). In the past federal courts have religiously construed the Hatch Act
in line with the decision in Mitchell, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
330 U.S. 127 (1947). Yet in two recent cases courts stated they felt obliged to regard it as
binding precedent. Northern Va. Regional Park Authority v. United States Civil Serv.
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earlier decision is that the Court there avoided the crucial question as to
what constitutes political activity3 6-the very question the Court in Letter
Carriers was confronted with. Furthermore, Justice Douglas in his dissent
condemns the use of this case as precedent emphasizing the fact that it is
out of step with current thinking on the question of first amendment in-
fringement, stating that since 1947 a number of decisions have demon-
strated the need for conscientiously drawn statutes that touch first amend-
ment rights."
The Letter Carriers decision apparently rejects the current trend toward
the expansion of the first amendment freedoms of speech and association
and regresses instead to the hard line approach that political, activity of
government employees must be limited at all costs. 38 Although the circum-
stances surrounding the introduction of the Hatch Act may have justified
its original enactment, it is questionable whether the policy reason for
having such a law still exists today,39 especially bearing in mind that the
Comm'n, 437 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971); Wisconsin State
Employees Ass'n v. Wisconsin Natural Resources Bd., 298 F. Supp. 339 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
Both cases appear to have followed Mitchell largely because they felt, as lower courts, duty
demanded they respect the prior decision of the Supreme Court. However, two even more
recent cases have decided the time has come to reexamine the Act "in light of controlling
precedents." National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346 F.
Supp. 578, 585 (D.D.C. 1972) citing Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971);
Mancuso v. Taft, 341 F. Supp. 574 (D.R.I. 1972).
36. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94 (1947). In Mitchell the court stated
that the plaintiff's activity clearly fell within the prohibition of the Hatch Act against taking
an active part in political management or political campaigning and so the constitutionality
of the broad definition of "political activity" was not passed on. Instead the Court held the
Hatch Act could make the plaintiff's conduct the basis for disciplinary action without violat-
ing the Constitution.
37. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S.Ct. 2880,
2906 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Brennan & Marshall J.J., concurring).
38. In deciding the case the Court gave little or no credence to the possible validity of
several recent state decisions which found "little Hatch Acts" in their respective states
facially unconstitutional. See Huerta v. Flood, 103 Ariz. 608, 447 P.2d 866 (1968); Kinnear v.
San Francisco, 61 Cal.2d 341, 392 P.2d 391, 38 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1964); Fort v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 61 Cal.2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964); Minielly v. State, 242 Or.
490, 411 P.2d 69 (1966).
39. Though originally enacted with political bossism in mind, it appears in light of recent
developments in and around the District of Columbia, that possibly the Act needs some re-
direction of its prohibitions. It seems odd that an Act, which restricts millions of lower and
middle level government employees, while permitting higher officials who have much more
actual power to be as politically partisan as possible, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(d) (1970), can be said
to be effectively accomplishing its objectives.
The weight of legal commentary in connection with the Hatch Act seems to be in keeping
with the suggestion that a thorough re-evaluation of the act is long overdue. In support of
the foregoing, see Esman, The Hatch Act - A Reappraisal, 60 YALE L.J. 986 (1951); Nelson,
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average individual's substantive constitutional rights are being unjustifia-
bly abridged in guarding against possible harm to the public interest.
D.J.M.
Public Employees and the Right to Engage in Political Activity, 9 VAND. L. REv. 27 (1955);
Rose, A Critical Look at the Hatch Act, 75 HARv. L. REv. 510 (1962); Note, The Hatch Act
- Political Immaturity? 45 GEo. L.J. 233 (1956); Wormuth, The Hatch Act Cases, 1 WESTERN
POL. Q. 165 (1948).
